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FRIENDS, FAMILY, OR FOOLS: ENTREPRENEUR EXPERIENCE AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR EQUITY DISTRIBUTION AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Who helps entrepreneurs raise the resources they need and how much equity does an entrepreneur 
distribute in return? We use a sample of 611 entrepreneurs in the U.S. to examine why some 
entrepreneurs are more likely than others to distribute ownership selectively to helpers. We find that 
entrepreneurs with specific industry experience and start-up experience are able to provide ownership 
more selectively and raise more resources from their helpers. We refine the categorization of social ties 
further to make a distinction between professional and familial ties to show that the ownership 
distribution and types of resource contributions vary by the mix of ties in the entrepreneur’s helper 
network. Our findings have implications for theories of resource assembly, social structure and 
entrepreneurship, and organization design.  
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Resource mobilization is a critical step in entrepreneurship, particularly the micro-social processes 
that influence the quality and quantity of resources that an individual can mobilize towards the 
exploitation of an entrepreneurial opportunity. Scholars have focused on social ties between the 
entrepreneurs and other professionally-organized resource providers such as angel or venture capital 
investors.  Much less studied is the process prior to raising formal capital, that is, how the entrepreneur 
mobilizes resources from family, friends, and colleagues. We examine what drives some entrepreneurs to 
distribute ownership selectively in a new venture. 
We adopt the perspective of a nascent entrepreneur as being embedded in a web of social relations 
that help create a new organization. We suggest that entrepreneur’s with specific industry experience 
follow different paths in the distribution of ownership to the helpers and mobilize different resources than 
entrepreneurs without such experience. Our approach complements prior work by showing that 
individuals with experience design the organization differently than those without it. We examine how the 
heterogeneity in the proportion of family and professional ties across entrepreneurs’ helper networks 
influence the distribution of equity to the helpers and the entrepreneur’s ability to raise more and higher 
quality resources. We test these predictions in a sample of 611 entrepreneurs in the US. 
Our results reveal that there is a positive relationship between specific human capital of the 
entrepreneur and selective equity distribution and concurrent higher resource mobilization. When an 
entrepreneur’s experience increases by one standard deviation (9.7 years) from no experience, the equity 
retained goes up from 70% to 73%.  When specific industry experience increases from eight years (mean) 
to 18 years (mean plus one std. dev.), then the equity retained increases by from 73% to 74%, an increase 
of only 1%. Entrepreneurs with prior start-up experience retain 4.3% more equity than those without such 
experience.  We find if the number of family ties in the helper group increases by one standard deviation, 
then the entrepreneur’s equity retained decreases by 7.1%. Similarly, when family ties increase by one 
standard deviation, the selective distribution doubles by 8.8%, suggesting that as family ties increase in 
the helper network, the entrepreneur is far less likely to distribute equity selectively.   
Results from the resource mobilization estimations support the prediction that entrepreneurs with 
prior start-up experience are able to raise more professional and personal resources than those without 
experience. Entrepreneurs with specific industry experience raise more professional resources, but after a 
point, specific industry experience leads to diminishing marginal returns. Because equity structures have 
persistent effects on future strategic decisions, these findings have merit both in theories of organizational 
emergence and the practice of entrepreneurship. 
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2. INTRODUCTION 
How entrepreneurs mobilize resources in the pursuit of an opportunity is a central question in 
entrepreneurship, particularly the micro-social processes that underlie the quality and quantity of 
resources that an individual can mobilize (Baker and Nelson, 2005; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2008). 
Studies have focused on network ties between entrepreneurs and their financiers (Shane and Cable, 2002; 
Zheng et al., 2010); and the prominence of the entrepreneur (Burton, Sorensen, and Beckman, 2002) to 
explain capital mobilization from professional investors.  In parallel, there is a rich literature in financial 
economics on how contracts, staging of capital, and risk shifting, help entrepreneurs raise capital from 
professional investors overcoming the information asymmetry problem (e.g., Gompers, 1995; Lerner, 
1995; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003; Ekchardt, Shane, and Delmar, 2006). Much less studied is the process 
prior to raising formal capital, that is, how entrepreneurs mobilize resources from family, friends, and 
colleagues (Khayesi and George, 2011; Vissa, 2010, 2011). 
Resources for the new venture are typically mobilized from individuals (henceforth, ‘helpers’) 
based on prior social (family, friendship or professional) relationships with the entrepreneur. 
Contributions from the helpers may require an exchange of financial interest (equity) in the venture (Biais 
and Perotti, 2004; Hellmann, 2007). Scholars who have examined these questions have restricted 
themselves to examining the distribution of equity within a set of entrepreneurs who form teams i.e. have 
equity owning helpers.  In uncertain situations, actors rely on individuals with whom there have been 
prior exchange relationships because information on the reliability of these individuals as exchange 
partners is readily available (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1995). Here, the norms of behavior in groups with 
family ties focus on equitable distribution with supporting evidence that start-up teams composed of 
members with family social ties tend to have the same share in the equity of the venture (Ruef, Aldrich, 
Carter, 2003; Ruef, 2004). Given the variety of ownership structures and the plurality of resources 
mobilized in new ventures, the conditions under which entrepreneurs deviate from equitable distribution 
of ownership is worth revisiting.  Consequently, we seek to explain why some entrepreneurs distribute 
equity selectively and are concurrently able to mobilize more heterogeneous resources from their helpers.  
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We argue that focal entrepreneurs with specific experience are able to overcome information 
problems to structure the equity distribution to their team members (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; 
Shane, 2000). Specific experience provides individuals information on the resources needed and the 
individuals who likely possess these resources (Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Shane, 2000; Delmar and 
Shane, 2006; Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2009).  Hence, entrepreneurs with specific experience are 
more likely to deviate from the equal distribution of ownership. We complement studies on human capital 
(Gimeno, Folta, Cooper and Woo, 1997), entry into entrepreneurship (Sorenson, 2007), and survival of 
start-ups (Romanelli, 1989) by showing that specific experience influences the organizational design of 
the start-up through selective distribution of ownership. We test these arguments in a sample of 611 U.S. 
entrepreneurs using data drawn from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED). The PSED 
was designed to collect information on nascent entrepreneurs in the process of creating new ventures to 
overcome the survivor bias that plagues many entrepreneurship studies.  
In so doing, this study makes four contributions to the literature. First, we focus on an exchange 
that has received little empirical investigation in economic and organizational studies i.e. the exchange 
between the entrepreneur and helper. Most entrepreneurs do not write contracts with their helpers, 
particularly at nascent stages of firm formation, and tend to rely on equity ownership as the incentive 
mechanism to mobilize resources (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). This is a tricky problem because the 
entrepreneur may not know ex ante which resources would be needed and the timing of such need.  
Equity once granted usually cannot be taken back, even if the helper shirks. Therefore, it becomes critical 
that the entrepreneur identifies helpers with resources and ensures that helpers will provide these 
promised resources. We suggest that entrepreneurs with specific industry experience are able to overcome 
this uncertainty and distribute ownership more selectively.  Second, we provide evidence for the role of 
the entrepreneur’s prior experience in shaping the incentive regimes and resource mobilization. We test a 
proximal causal link to experience theories of entrepreneurship that have argued for a relationship 
between experience and start-up performance (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000).  Third, some work 
suggests that entrepreneurs can draw on their close social relations for resources and may not have to 
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reward these relations with equity, but possibly compensate with other means such as social standing or 
side payments of other resources (Aldrich, 1999; Davidsson and Honig, 2003). We follow others who 
have suggested an alternative view that social structures that compose of family ties have norms of 
behavior that are akin to generalized exchange, i.e. based on fairness and hence the entrepreneurs who 
depend on family relations for resources have to distribute equity less selectively to helpers who are 
family relations (Ruef, 2004). Finally, we use a more context-specific categorization of social ties as 
professional or familial ties, enabling us to make predictions on the ownership distribution and the types 
of resources generated from the helper network.  
2. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS 
To explain resource mobilization by entrepreneurs, we first clarify the role of resources in firm 
formation. We identify a helper network that assists the entrepreneur in venture formation, to explain the 
entrepreneur’s choices when identifying and valuing potential resources and resource providers under 
conditions of uncertainty. Next, we define the relevant constructs and the links between them. 
Resources.  Resources are the cornerstones of a firm’s existence and growth (George, 2005; 
Penrose, 1959). An entrepreneur who is not wealth-constrained may garner resources by paying for them 
with cash. The starting assumption though is that the entrepreneur is wealth-constrained and requires 
capital from others, as both the ability to identify entrepreneurial opportunities and the wealth to exploit 
these opportunities is likely to exist among different individuals. Given that lending to new ventures is 
prone to default risk as the new ventures lack operational history and assets (Bhide, 2000), bank financing 
that is typically based on collateral is not amenable.  Consequently, entrepreneurs have to frequently rely 
on other individuals for resources and pay the helpers with a share in future cash flows, i.e. equity in the 
new venture. The question then becomes: what types of resources are needed and how does the 
entrepreneur value them? 
Breadth of resources. We examine resource assembly in nascent ventures prior to professional 
investment, when most contributions also include non-cash resources. Prior research shows that gathering 
different types of resources by the nascent entrepreneurs and initiating more activities explain successful 
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new venture creation when compared to abandonment (Carter, et al., 1997). Whereas empirical evidence 
on the sequencing of resource generating activities is inconclusive, there is some evidence to suggest that 
the greater the total number of resources and activities initiated by the nascent entrepreneur, the higher the 
likelihood that a venture survives (Carter et al., 1997). Other studies have argued that the source and 
consequences of affective resource contributions: moral support and encouragement have a different 
impact on nascent venture outcomes, when compared to more instrumental resources like introductions to 
suppliers and customers (Gimeno et al., 1997; Vissa, 2010).  Given the focus on non-cash resources that 
are hard to value but critical to survival, prior research has argued for resource heterogeneity or the 
breadth of resources as being critical (Hite and Hesterly, 2001; Khayesi and George, 2011).  
Helper network. Helpers are individuals in the focal entrepreneur’s network who assist in the 
founding process with or without ownership in the new venture. The focal entrepreneur is the individual 
who has the initial idea, and spends time and effort in organizing the new venture. Hansen (1995) uses the 
concept of “action set” to indicate all individuals helping the entrepreneur. Other scholars have suggested 
that the entrepreneur’s network and the nascent venture are virtually synonymous, as helpers are tied to 
the individual entrepreneur. Because we study nascent ventures, we focus on the helper network of the 
focal entrepreneur, and how the entrepreneur raises resources in exchange for equity. 
  Valuation of resources.  Entrepreneurs are wealth constrained and cannot raise debt to pay for 
resources needed as the venture suffers from liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965). Consequently, 
they offer equity in the venture in exchange for resource contributions.  A critical issue then becomes the 
basis on which the entrepreneur decides to distribute equity to the helpers. A theoretical example on how 
entrepreneurs may be selective with equity distribution, the potential resource mobilization scenarios, and 
the decision choice set faced by the focal entrepreneur is stylistically depicted in Figure 1. The captures 
the choice set facing the focal entrepreneur. In the quest for resources, the focal entrepreneur can provide 
equity equally to all helpers which would be the least selective distribution or alternatively hold all equity 
by offering to make side payments for the resource contributions which would be the most selective 
distribution of equity. How much equity does the entrepreneur retain, how she distributes equity to her 
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helpers, and what resources she gathers in return are the central questions of this paper (see Figure 1 for 
various options).  
____________________ 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
____________________ 
 There are two ways to frame the question of ownership patterns in nascent ventures.  From a 
theory-driven lens, one could plausibly argue that human capital factors, such as experience, allow 
entrepreneurs to retain more equity and garner greater variety of resources.  The challenge with this 
approach is that it would not naturally bring to contrast the issue of selective or unequal distribution of 
equity. Alternatively, we can frame the research question around the empirical anomaly of why some 
entrepreneurs distribute equity selectively while others do not.  Such an anomaly-driven approach allows 
us to contrast different theoretical possibilities and challenge existing frameworks that help explain 
ownership patterns. In this way, we examine equity distribution from a perspective that would not 
normally be anticipated from extrapolations of existing theories, thereby advancing research in a 
practically relevant manner (Colquitt and George, 2011).  
We start with the distribution of equity in a venture as a phenomenon of entrepreneurial relevance 
that has engaged different theoretical perspectives. The managerial agency view of organizing a firm 
would be that one individual (the entrepreneur) specializes in metering and monitoring others and claims 
the residual profits after paying others a fixed salary for their effort (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).  This 
view ignores the wealth constraints of the entrepreneur to pay the salary. The alternative is for the 
individuals to form a team with a share in the future profits of the nascent venture. The distribution of the 
right to future profits, i.e. equity, may lead to organizational pathologies (Olson, 1965). Individuals who 
promise effort may shirk, knowing that they will get a share in the profits regardless of whether they put 
in effort or not once they have equity in the new venture (Holmstrom, 1982).  This puts the entrepreneur 
in a bind: will helpers who promise resources or effort in the future fulfill their obligation after they 
receive equity?  
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Viewing the same issue from a behavioral theory perspective, which compares distributive justice 
versus procedural justice (Thibaut and Walker, 1975), does not offer a satisfactory solution. Fair 
procedure would require clear and transparent rules for equity allocation at the start of the nascent 
venture, a requirement which is unlikely in the idiosyncratic founding process. Distributive justice would 
require the entrepreneur ex ante estimate what resources are needed, which helper will contribute what 
resources, and what is the relative value of the helper’s resource contribution – all difficult, if not 
implausible, given the fundamental uncertainty surrounding new ventures (Alvarez and Barney, 2005). 
When facing such uncertainty, prior experience has been argued to play a positive role in improving 
performance (Becker, 1975). This leads to our theoretical framework of the specific experience of the 
entrepreneur guiding equity distribution in a certain pattern which enables the entrepreneur to raise more 
resources from her helpers. Before we explain why experience could drive patterns of ownership 
distribution and resources mobilization, we review the literature on social relations that suggests social 
ties can overcome behavioral uncertainty to make predictions on the selective distribution of equity and 
resource mobilization based on heterogeneity in social ties. 
4. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 Specific Industry Experience and Equity Distribution 
 Specific industry experience is shown to be positively related to venture survival and success. 
Delmar and Shane (2006) suggest that industry experience helps in three ways. First, industry experience 
leads to greater information on the requirements of customers and their problems. Second, most of the 
rent generating information on products and services is tacit and is available only through participation in 
the industry (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Thus, entrepreneurs with industry experience can gather and 
use new information faster than entrepreneurs without such information.  Finally, industry participation 
provides knowledge of the norms, practices and routines in an industry. By adopting the dominant logic 
of organization in an industry, entrepreneurs are able to increase the legitimacy of the venture in the eyes 
of resource providers (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994).  
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Entrepreneurs with relevant industry experience are more likely to be aware of the resources 
needed and the individuals from whom they can be secured (Hellmann and Puri, 2002). Therefore, 
entrepreneurs with industry experience can reduce both the valuation and behavioral uncertainty 
surrounding the venture.  Consequently, a nascent venture in which the focal entrepreneur has industry 
experience may be more viable and valuable; wherein the entrepreneur can selectively distribute equity to 
secure the same resources. Hence, entrepreneurs with industry experience are more likely to deviate from 
the equal distribution of ownership. 
In firm formation, industry experience may also lead to the discovery of entrepreneurial 
opportunities. Here, experience provides a lens to interpret information and relate it to applications for 
new products or services (Dimov, 2007; Shane, 2000). Individuals with industry experience may also 
have higher thresholds for the opportunities that they would consider to start a new venture, possibly 
because they can find jobs more easily at higher salaries (Gimeno et al., 1997). Consequently, individuals 
with industry experience may have a higher alternative income source to starting a new venture, resulting 
in them rejecting opportunities with low profit potential.  Hence, ventures started by individuals with 
experience, on average, may be more valuable than those ventures started by individuals without such 
experience (Davidsson and Honig, 2003). Furthermore, specific experience gives individuals with 
cognitive frameworks to solve problem in a domain that novices lack (Glaser and Chi, 1988). These 
arguments suggest that entrepreneurs with industry experience may indentify more valuable opportunities 
and perform better than entrepreneurs without it. Because ventures by entrepreneurs with specific 
experience may be more valuable than ventures wherein the entrepreneur lacks such experience, an 
entrepreneur with experience can offer a lower share in a higher value venture than those without industry 
experience who have to offer a bigger share for the same resource from helpers. The result would be that 
entrepreneur’s with specific experience would retain more ownership. 
Several studies find that the functional form of the empirical relationship between experience and 
performance when measured as survival, sales (Delmar and Shane, 2006) or innovation (Kotha et al., 
2011) is curvilinear. The rationale is that experience beyond a certain point constraints mental models of 
 11 
decision-makers and restricts their ability to conceptualize and solve new problems; resulting in 
ossification and rigidities in decision-making (Sorensen and Stuart, 2001). Beyond a threshold, more 
experience may not commensurately improve the ability of the entrepreneur to identify opportunities or 
value resources.  Hence, the initial positive relationship between prior industry experience and the value 
of the new venture is likely to exhibit diminishing marginal returns. Consequently, these entrepreneurs 
with much higher specific experience would have to part with as much equity as those with high specific 
experience for the same resource from the helper as the potential value of both these ventures would be 
equivalent. Therefore, the influence of experience on the equity retained or selectively distributed is also 
likely to exhibit diminishing marginal returns.  Based on the above, we posit that:  
Hypothesis 1a: Entrepreneur’s specific industry experience is positively related to 
the equity retained. However, after a certain level of prior experience, the 
relationship will be subject to diminishing marginal returns.   
 
Hypothesis 1b: Entrepreneur’s specific industry experience is positively related to 
the selective distribution of equity. However, after a certain level of prior 
experience, the relationship will be subject to diminishing marginal returns. 
 
4.2 Social Relationships and Equity Distribution 
Entrepreneurs rely on social relations for encouragement, advice, and support (Aldrich, 1999; 
Gimeno et al., 1997).  In theories of exchange, actors show a preference to transact with prior exchange 
partners when they are uncertain about the possible behavior of the exchange partner (Granovetter, 1985; 
Gulati, 1995). Since information on prior exchange partners is available at little cost; in conditions of 
uncertainty, actors transact with prior partners (Podolny, 1993). Consistent with these arguments, Ruef et 
al. (2003) found that the entrepreneurs are more likely to select close social relations as team members, 
and, interestingly, show a marked preference for close social ties over team diversity.  
In addition to providing behavioral certainty, if a group is composed of strong ties there is a moral 
pressure to prevent opportunistic behavior (Coleman, 1988). Social relationships may foster clique or 
club-like behaviors, wherein contributing members can be rewarded with social acclaim and non-
contributors are ostracized (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Lin, 1999; Morgan and Sorensen, 1999), 
making it is less expensive to monitor each other (Coleman, 1988). Consequently, in groups where social 
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relationships are predominant, the prevalence of shirking or free riding would be reduced. Social relations 
may also unilaterally contribute resources without a cost-benefit analysis (Aldrich, 1999). Contribution of 
resources without cost-benefit analysis assumes greater importance in this context because firm formation 
is highly risky and many ventures fail to yield any positive return on investment.  
The preceding arguments may suggest that helpers who are close social relations of the focal 
entrepreneur are more willing to part with resources to help the focal entrepreneur even if they are not 
sure if their help would be repaid in full. Extending this reasoning, one could argue that the entrepreneur 
takes advantage of the unilateral contributions by family members and does not part with equity because 
these helpers may be content with social acclaim. However, such reasoning ignores the symmetric nature 
of exchange, i.e. when helpers who are family do not make cost-benefit calculus when it comes to 
resource provision the entrepreneur in turn may be bound by the same norms of fairness in distributing 
equity in the new venture.  When the helper network consists of family members, the focal entrepreneur, 
in turn, does not make cost-benefit calculus and distinguish between different family members who 
provide resources because close social relations are often guided by norms of fairness and equality (Levi-
Strauss, 1969; Piskorski and Anand, 2004; Luo and Chung 2005; Chang et al., 2009).  Ruef (2004) found 
that if the group consists of family ties, the percentage of equity given to individuals within a venture 
tends to be more evenly distributed. If the helper group is predominantly composed of family ties, one 
could expect that the entrepreneur will find it socially awkward to distinguish between the contributions 
of family members. In contrast, helper groups composed of professional ties are more likely to deviate 
from equal distribution of equity as the helpers who are not family will not demand equal treatment i.e. 
equal share in equity, regardless of the heterogeneity in their contributions.  
This is also consistent with work in sociology that finds individuals who perceive each other as 
equal in social class are more likely to bicker at even the slightest provocation (Gould, 2003). Hence, in 
groups composed of helpers who are family relations, the entrepreneur is more likely to provide equity 
evenly, not solely based on the expectation of resource contributions but rather due to affective 
commitment and norms of fairness. Therefore, we would expect that groups composed of family ties are 
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more likely to have equal (less selective) distribution of equity.  Consequently, when we consider the 
norms of fairness, entrepreneurs bound by close social ties are likely to retain less equity in the venture 
because of the tendency to distribute equity to all helpers. When the helpers are family ties, the 
entrepreneur is more likely to be generous in the distribution of equity to avoid perceptions of greed. 
Here, we expect that entrepreneurs with a helper network of family ties when compared to a helper 
network of professional ties are not only likely to distribute equity evenly to more members of the helper 
network, but also distribute more equity.  
Consider a helper network that consists of more professional members.  First, the professional ties 
are likely to be heterogeneous and provide more varied resources when compared to family ties who share 
a greater overlap in information and resources they provide (Burt, 2000; Chang et al., 2009). Hence, the 
entrepreneur with more professional ties in their helper network would have a higher variance in the value 
of the potential resources that these heterogeneous ties contribute; resulting in greater inequality of 
distribution of equity. Second, the entrepreneur is not obliged to include all professional ties in equity 
distribution as there is no perceived norm of generalized exchange wherein all members in the network 
know each other and hence exert a pressure on the focal entrepreneur to fair and equal in the distribution 
of equity. Therefore, we posit that: 
Hypothesis 2a: Entrepreneurs whose helper network consists of a higher proportion 
of professional over family ties will retain higher levels of equity in the nascent 
venture.   
 
Hypothesis 2b: Entrepreneurs whose helper network consists of a higher proportion 
of professional over family ties will be more selective in the distribution of equity in 
the nascent venture.   
 
 
4.3 Start-up Experience and Equity Distribution 
 
Jovanovic (1982) suggests that individuals learn by entering new markets because entry exposes 
them to factors that determine success within that industry. Individuals with prior start-up experience or 
worked for a new venture are trained to be entrepreneurs by exposure to the entrepreneurial process 
(Gompers et al., 2005; Sorensen, 2007; Ucbasaran et al., 2009). These individuals are more likely to 
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encourage customers and suppliers to make relationship-specific investments (Hellmann, 2002). The 
appetite for risk of individuals with prior start-up experience may also be correspondingly higher than 
others because they have made a conscious choice to become an entrepreneur (Jovanovic, 1979).  
Individuals with start-up experience are also likely to be aware of the resources needed to create a 
successful venture, and from whom these resources can be secured. Furthermore, serial entrepreneurs are 
more likely raise capital from professional investors with greater ease (Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein, 
2005), which allows the entrepreneur to be selective in offering equity to fewer individuals. If prior 
experience is related to the discovery of opportunities (Shane, 2000), then entrepreneurs with start-up 
experience may also be able to identify higher quality opportunities than novice entrepreneurs, which 
further increases the expected value of the nascent venture (Bhide, 2000).  
Given than individuals with prior start-up experience may require a higher quality threshold for 
their subsequent venture (Gimeno et al., 1997), the value of these ventures will be, on average, higher 
than ventures founded by individuals without start-up experience. This higher potential value results in 
the following outcomes: the focal entrepreneur with start-up experience can offer a lower share in the 
venture than entrepreneur without experience for the same resource. Therefore, entrepreneurs with prior 
start-up experience are likely to pay helpers with a lower percentage of equity. Furthermore, 
entrepreneurs with start-up experience will have a better knowledge of resource holders from their prior 
experience (Hellmann and Puri, 2002). Consequently, entrepreneurs with start-up experience will be more 
selective in distributing ownership. Therefore, we posit that: 
Hypothesis 3a: Entrepreneurs with prior start-up experience will retain more equity 
than entrepreneurs who lack such prior start-up experience. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Entrepreneurs with prior start-up experience will distribute equity 
more selectively than entrepreneurs who lack such prior start-up experience. 
 
4. 4 Resource Mobilization 
Specific industry and start-up experience of the entrepreneur and resource mobilization. Specific 
industry experience and start-up experience provide the entrepreneur with knowledge of the types of 
resources needed and their inherent value. Spender (1985) uses the term “industry recipes” to capture the 
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know-how that exists within an industry that gives managers the ability to structure work under 
uncertainty. This knowledge gives entrepreneurs a clear understanding of the task or resources needed; 
how these resources are combined (process), and awareness of the individuals who possess these 
resources. Specific experience also helps entrepreneurs evaluate the combination of resources that will 
likely yield greater value than the individual resources (Alvarez and Barney, 2005). Since experienced 
entrepreneurs can better estimate the value of a resource, they are able to offer a fair price with a share in 
the venture. Consequently, resource providers are likely to contribute resources to ventures where 
entrepreneurs possess specific experience. 
Let us consider the resource assembly from the helper perspective. Given that ventures have 
substantial uncertainty associated with their success, it may be difficult for resource owners to value the 
equity they receive from the entrepreneur. In conditions of uncertainty, ability is signaled by making 
costly and irreversible investment (Spence, 1973). Prior experience and education of the focal 
entrepreneur act as a signal of quality to holders of resources (Hellmann and Puri, 2002); wherein 
professional helpers are likely to place greater credibility on the success of the venture if the entrepreneur 
has industry or startup experience. Therefore, even from the helper perspective, specific experience of the 
entrepreneur acts as a signal of quality and assuages concern over the uncertainty involved in contributing 
resources for future payoffs. In such cases, the entrepreneur will find it easier to raise resources from 
professional helpers in the form of assistance, advice, business introductions and training among others.   
However, the returns to industry experience may diminish after a point as a new venture creation 
requires multiple skills (Delmar and Shane, 2006). For example, engineers with product design and 
industry knowledge may need individuals with complementary skills in marketing and sales. Hence, 
industry experience may yield diminishing returns for resource mobilization.  In contrast, we expect that 
startup experience will be positively related to resource mobilization. For diminishing returns to occur 
here, we have to assume that all startup experience is homogenous, which is unlikely as entrepreneurs 
may learn different things from every startup experience. Therefore, we posit a positive relationship 
between having start-up experience and the professional resources mobilized from the helper group.   
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Hypothesis 4a: There is a positive relationship between prior specific industry 
experience of the entrepreneur and professional resources mobilized from helpers. 
However, after a certain level of prior experience, the relationship will be subject to 
diminishing marginal returns  
 
Hypothesis 4b: Entrepreneurs with prior startup experience will mobilize more 
professional resources from helpers than entrepreneurs without such prior start-up 
experience. 
 
Social ties of the entrepreneur and resource mobilization. The proportion of family and 
professional ties across entrepreneurs’ helper networks are likely to vary significantly. A network of 
helpers with a greater proportion of family than professional ties is more likely to have two distinctive 
features. First, a network dominated by family ties is likely to contain multiple redundant ties to third 
parties that are not a part of focal actor’s/entrepreneur’s helper network (Granovetter, 1985; Burt, 1992). 
While there are possible advantages to redundant ties to a third party (Coleman, 1988), the redundancy in 
networks also implies that the total number of unique contacts is correspondingly lower. Hence, networks 
of predominantly family ties may have fewer number of individuals from whom the entrepreneur can 
mobilize resources.  Second, actors in a network of family ties are more likely to be homogeneous in 
terms of socialization i.e. education, membership in organizations etc. (Blau, 1977). Consequently, the 
focal entrepreneur whose network of helpers consists of predominantly family ties may have reduced 
access to novel information and ideas compared to those whose networks have greater heterogeneity in 
composition (Burt, 1992). Whereas we anticipate that family ties would help mobilize more personal 
resources from the network, the reduced access to different types of contacts and a less diverse set of 
resources would imply that the entrepreneurs raise fewer professional resources needed for the nascent 
venture (Hite and Hesterly, 2001).  Therefore, we posit that:  
Hypothesis 4c: Entrepreneurs who have a greater proportion of family ties will 
mobilize more personal resources and fewer professional resources from their helper 
network.   
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5. METHOD 
 
5. 1 Sample 
 
 We test the hypotheses using data from the Panel Study for Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED; 
see Reynolds and Curtin (2004) for a complete description of the data collection methodology). The 
PSED is a random sample of the adult population in the US.  The object of the survey was to collect data 
on individuals who are in the process of new venture creation.  Nearly 65,000 individuals over the age of 
18 were contacted through random digit telephone dialing and asked if they, alone or with others, were 
starting a new venture or starting a new venture for their employer; if they had done anything to help start 
a new venture in the past 12 months (organize a team, work on a business plan, and etc.). If the 
respondent answered yes for both the questions they qualified as nascent entrepreneurs (6,055 qualified).  
From this pool, a random sample was invited to participate in the survey and 830 individuals 
agreed. Data were also collected on a comparison group of 431 individuals who were not engaged in the 
process of creating a venture. For a complete description of the sampling strategy refer to Gartner et al., 
(2004).  From the 830 cases, we omit few cases either due to lack of information or the respondents 
lacking helpers. There are 155 cases where the respondent did not have any helpers (113 cases) or did not 
disclose social relationship information (42 cases). We drop 64 cases with missing information on 
dependent or control variables resulting 611 cases for the analysis. We use several control variables and a 
sample selection correction to ensure that our results are robust to dropping these cases. The use of 
sampling weights provided by the Institute of Survey Research, University of Michigan to control for the 
selection probability based on age, sex, race, and education did not have any qualitative change on our 
results, hence we report estimations without sampling weights. 
5.2 Respondent as Focal Actor 
Since our theory is about the focal actor’s human capital and social structure, we conduct several 
tests to ensure that treating respondents are focal actors does not bias our results. We created an indicator 
variable if the respondent has higher or equal share in the venture as the next highest equity holding 
individual member, with the assumption that the focal actor will have majority or near majority stake in 
 18 
the venture. We exclude observations where the respondent did not have highest equity holding as 
information on all explanatory variables for the next highest equity holder is not available in the PSED. 
When we run a selection model for omitting cases, our results for the theory variables remain similar. 
 5.3 Complete Set of Embedded Entrepreneurs and their Helpers 
Starting with helpers, rather than a restricted set of equity holders or a further sub classification of 
equity members who are active in the formation of a new venture i.e. team members, enables us to 
incorporate choices by the focal entrepreneur to selectively give equity to some helpers and not others 
(refer to Figure 1). We include cases where the focal entrepreneur has helpers but retains all the equity 
herself, which is the strongest form of selective distribution of equity in our setting (Figure 1). The 
primary advantage of this approach is to include nearly 30% of all entrepreneurs who do not distribute 
ownership.  These entrepreneurs may nevertheless rely on their social relations for resources but may 
provide other forms of side compensations for these resources other than equity 
5. 4 Estimation Strategy 
We predict ownership distribution and resource mobilization by entrepreneurs. We are concerned 
about unobserved factors that are not in our estimation that may influence the entry of individuals into 
entrepreneurship and be correlated with our explanatory variables. To control for these hard to observe 
factors, we employ a two-stage strategy. In the first stage, we estimate the likelihood that an individual 
will enter into entrepreneurship. In the second stage, we estimate the resource mobilization or ownership 
distribution. By allowing a correlation between errors in the first and second stage, unobserved variables 
that influence entry into entrepreneurship and ownership distribution or resource mobilization is 
accounted for. We follow Shaver (1998) in predicting the probability that an individual will enter into 
entrepreneurship and use the predicted values from this estimation as a control variable in ownership 
distribution and resource mobilization estimations.  
We use the explanatory variables suggested by Kim, Aldrich and Keister (2006) to predict the 
probability that an individual becomes an entrepreneur. Two variables that serve as instruments are (1) if 
the respondents parents are foreign born, and (2) a four category geography region of the respondents 
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domicile. Several studies have shown that children of immigrant are more likely to enter into self 
employment. Furthermore, studies have shown the geographical heterogeneity of entry into 
entrepreneurship (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Since both factors influence entry into entrepreneurship 
and not necessarily the organization of nascent venture, we use them as instruments in the estimation.  
In the second stage we estimate four dependent variables: equity retained by focal entrepreneur, 
selective distribution, and the count of professional and personal resources mobilized. The equity retained 
by the focal entrepreneur is bounded between 1% and 100%. We use fractional logit estimations because 
the fraction of equity held by a focal entrepreneur is never zero (Pakes and Wooldridge, 1996). We 
estimate fractional logit and tobit models, our results are similar for both estimations. We report the 
fractional logit results.  Finally, we use Negative Binomial Poisson Regression to estimate the count of 
professional and personal resources mobilized.  We use the negative binomial because the counts of 
professional and personal resources variables are subject to over dispersion.  
5.5 Dependent Variables 
Focal entrepreneur’s equity stake. In ventures where two or more individuals hold equity, the 
focal entrepreneur’s equity stage is the stake of equity held by the respondent if s/he is the highest or the 
joint highest equity holder. In 37 cases wherein the respondent did not hold the highest or the joint highest 
equity we could not use the data on individual with the highest equity as information of wealth and other 
control variables were collected only for the respondent. In robustness checks, we examine including and 
excluding these 37 cases; the results for the theory variables are substantively similar. Hence we include 
these cases in our analysis. In cases where one entrepreneur with helpers owns 100% of the equity, s/he is 
treated as the focal entrepreneur.  
Selective distribution of equity. From Figure 1, we see that the entrepreneur has to decide between 
giving any equity, to whom, and in what proportion. We draw on the wealth and resource distribution 
literature in economic theory and justice theories in sociology (Theil, 1967; Sen, 1972).  We measure 
inequality in ownership distribution using Gini coefficient, 
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where the number individuals is n, and yi is the income of person i. The average level of equity is 
u.  The Gini coefficient is the ratio of the difference between the line of absolute equality. It is a direct 
measure of difference taking note of difference between every pair of actors’ equity (Sen, 1972).  The 
correlation between Gini and Theil coefficients an alternate measure of inequality was .96.   
Resources mobilized: professional and personal is measured as the total number of non-cash 
resources contributed by the helpers with and without equity.  The entrepreneurs receive different types of 
resources in addition to the contribution of money and time. Since time and money are the least subjective 
resources and there is little valuation uncertainty, we focus on resources that are open to subjective 
valuation. Respondents were asked yes/no questions for each of the equity holding and non-equity helpers 
contributed: information, introductions, physical assets, financial help, business training, personal help, 
moral support, legal and accounting services, creative ideas, and labor. We group personal and moral 
support under personal resources and all other resources as professional resources.  We estimate models 
with dependent variables as the count of resources received in two categories: professional and personal.  
5.6 Independent Variables 
 Specific industry experience is the number of years of work experience the respondent had in the 
industry of the nascent venture prior to the start of the nascent venture. 
Start-up experience. We use prior start-up experience as a measure of specific human capital that 
enables the entrepreneur to estimate what resources are needed and who is likely to possess these 
resources. We use an indicator variable to take the value of “1” if the focal entrepreneur has started one or 
more prior ventures and “0” otherwise. 
Proportion of family ties, professional ties and strangers before startup in the helper network. 
First, we define and measure the size of the helper network before we can get to the proportion of 
different types of helpers. Helper network is the group of individuals who provide resources to the 
entrepreneur is the known as helper network (Uehara, 1990; Hansen, 1995). We use the two name-
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generator questions in the PSED to identify the number of individuals helping the entrepreneur with the 
new venture with and without equity. Respondents were asked to list names of 5 individuals and their 
equity holding including the respondent (focal entrepreneur). Further respondents were asked to list 5 
individuals who are helping the new venture without any equity (not including the focal entrepreneur). 
We add the responses to the two questions to determine the number of individuals who are helping the 
entrepreneur with the nascent venture. These individuals, who help either the focal entrepreneur with the 
new venture or the comparison group respondent with their career, meet the theoretical definition of a 
helper network. 
Given the count of helpers, we turn to questions that identify the type of helpers. Respondents 
were asked how they would describe their relationship to the equity holders and non-equity holding 
helpers. The relationships were: spouse or partners sharing household; relatives; business associates or 
work colleagues; friends or acquaintance; or strangers before the new venture. We code ties as family if 
the ties involved members who are a spouse/life-partner, parents, and relatives of the respondent. We sum 
the number of family ties and divide this by the number of members in the helper network to arrive at the 
proportion of family ties. Similarly we add the number of professional helpers and divide by the network 
size to get the proportion of the respondent’s helper network that consists of professional ties. Finally, we 
count the number of cases of no prior ties between the respondent and the helpers and divide it by the 
total number of helpers to get the proportion of helpers network that were strangers before the startup.  
5.7 Focal Actor Controls 
 We control for the race, gender, general human capital variables of the focal entrepreneur. We 
use a vector of variables to capture the role of human capital. Human capital is made up of education and 
work experience of the individual (Becker, 1975). Work experience is captured by three variables: age of 
the entrepreneur, full time work experience, and managerial experience. We log the full time experience 
and the managerial experience of the entrepreneur following the tradition in labor economics, since the 
marginal benefits of experience may not be monotonic. Managerial experience is the number of years in 
managerial, supervisory, or administrative experience. We use a three category variable to capture 
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education: high school, college, and graduate. We also control for the household income of the respondent 
as this may allow some respondents to purchase resources with their wealth. 
5.8 Controls on Group Structure 
 We use a set of control variables to account for heterogeneity in the composition of the group 
consisting of entrepreneur and her helpers. These variables are: proportion of institutional members, legal 
form, and group diversity. Institutional members is an indicator variable for non-persons holding 
ownership like banks or VCs. Legal form is a control variable for the registered legal form of the new 
venture: partnership, company, and other. We follow others in controlling for the demographic diversity 
in the group that may influence the equity distribution. We control for the gender, race and age diversity. 
Gender and race diversity are indicator variables that take a value of 1 if all the members in the group 
belong to the same category. Age diversity is the standard deviation of the group members’ age. 
 Side payments. Olson (1965) suggests that side incentives can be provided to motivate individuals 
to contribute resources in addition to interest (equity). Some forms of side payment are market price, 
barter, or other delayed payment mechanisms. To control for the role of side payment, we use the 
proportion of important resources that a helper provided that received a side payment (market 
price/barter/other).  
Industries may vary by the cost and need for the monitoring of effort of helpers. We use the 
industry which the nascent venture belongs to as a control variable to capture unobserved effects that are 
common to the industry of a start-up that could influence ownership distribution and resource 
contribution. 
 Nascent Venture Age.  We include in the analysis the time from the date which first activity for 
the nascent venture was organized. We classify the cohorts of nascent venture by the first organizing 
using an indicator variable following Gartner et al. (2004). This yielded four groups: one year, two years, 
three, and four or greater years.  
 Proportion of Helpers with Equity. Since a case can be that helpers with equity i.e. commonly 
termed as team members (Xu and Ruef, 2006), may contribute more resources or different resources than 
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helpers without equity we use an additional control for the proportion of helpers with equity in all 
estimations for resource contributions. 
 Average money and hours received. In all resource contribution estimations we include a control 
variable for the average money and time that helpers contributed. Information on the time and money 
contributed by the helpers is not available for all helpers, specifically this information was collected only 
for helpers who hold equity. In cases where this information is missing we use one of three methods: 
mean imputation, predicted values on observed values of all explanatory variable or setting the missing 
values to zero. We find that using any one of the above methods leads to similar results for the theory 
variables.  
5.9 Controls for the Environment 
Leverage.  Industries vary in the extent that debt or equity is used to finance a new venture. In 
industries in which debt is more common it is unlikely that the entrepreneur will relinquish a larger share 
of the equity for resources. To control for the financial structure of the industry, we collect information on 
the debt to equity, i.e. leverage ratio.  We have augmented the PSED data set with industry accounting 
ratios from the Internal Revenue Service using the Almanac of Business and Industrial Financial Ratios 
(Troy, 2000) for the years 1997 and 1998 which precede the PSED sample.  
 Dynamism. We add two indicator variables to measure the level of dynamism in the environment. 
The questions are (1) if the product or service was new to market, and (2) whether research and 
development was important for the start-up. If either of the questions was answered in affirmative we 
coded the variable as one and otherwise as zero. 
6. RESULTS 
We report the descriptive statistics of the variables used in equity distribution in Table 1.  In 
Table 2, we report the correlations.  Table 3 presents the fractional logit estimations of the stake retained 
in the nascent venture by the focal entrepreneur in Models 1 and 2; and of the selective distribution in 
Models 3 and 4. Model 1 and 3 are the control models. In Models 2 and 4 we introduce the theory 
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variables: family ties, professional ties, strangers before start-up, specific industry experience, and start-
up experience.  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 – 4 About Here 
----------------------------------------- 
We find support for only the linear relationship between specific industry experience and equity 
retained and not for the diminishing marginal returns to experience after a level of experience (H1a). The 
linear term is positive and significantly related to the equity stake that the entrepreneur retains (b= .017, 
p<.10) the squared term is negative but not significant. We find support for Hypothesis 2a that when an 
entrepreneur’s helper network contains a greater number of professional ties the entrepreneur will retain 
more equity (H1a). In Table 3: Model 2 the coefficient of professional ties proportion is positive and 
significant (b=.83; p<.01). Hypothesis 3a on the relationship between prior start-up experience and 
greater retention of ownership is supported. We find that prior start-up experience is positively related to 
the equity the focal entrepreneur retains (b=.24, p<.05). 
Models 3 and 4 (Table 3) are the estimations of selective distribution of equity.  Model 3 consists 
of the control variables. We find, that specific industry experience is positively related to inequitable 
distribution of equity (the linear term b=.013, p<.10), supporting H1b. The squared term is negative but 
not significant. We find support for Hypothesis 2b, as professional ties increase the entrepreneur becomes 
more selective in distributing equity (b= .97, p<.01). As posited by Hypothesis 3b, we find that prior start-
up experience is positively related to inequitable distribution (b=.22, p<.01). When we substitute the 
Gini’s measure of selectiveness with the Theil’s and re-estimate the model, we find that all the 
explanatory variables are supported and there is no qualitative difference in using either measure of 
inequitable distribution.  
The set of estimations in Table 4 predicts the number of professional and personal resources 
mobilized. Models 5 and 7 are models with controls variables and Model 6 and Model 8 test the theory 
variables on count of professional and personal resources received respectively. In Model 6 of Table 4 we 
introduce the direct effect of social ties and experience variables (industry and start-up) to predict the 
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count of professional resources received by the entrepreneur. We find, as predicted by hypothesis 4a, that 
the relationship between specific industry experience and professional resource mobilization is 
curvilinear. The linear term is positive and significant and the quadratic term is negative and significant, 
thereby supporting Hypothesis 4a (linear term b=.015, p<.001; quadratic term b= -.0004, p<.01). Notice 
that there is no significant relationship between specific industry experience and personal resources. 
Hypothesis 4b on the positive effect of start-up experience is supported (b=.074, p<.05). Furthermore, 
individuals with prior start-up experience are also more likely to garner personal resources; this is a 
relationship which we did not predict. 
Hypothesis 4c predicts that entrepreneurs who rely on family ties will mobilize more personal 
resources and fewer professional resources is supported. The personal resources mobilized increase in 
proportion with family ties in the helper network (b=.99, p<.001, Model 8). Interestingly, there is no 
statistically significant effect of family ties on raising professional resources. Similarly, the positive 
relationship between the proportion of professional ties and professional resources is significant (b=.23, 
p<.01) but not for personal resources.  
6.1 Robustness Checks 
The results support our interpretation that some entrepreneurs with specific human capital retain 
more equity; distribute equity selectively to helpers; and raise more professional resources. We have 
made some assumptions on the agency of a focal entrepreneur as embedded in a web of helpers. First, the 
assumption that there is a unique focal entrepreneur may be strong, we conduct tests to see if we relaxed 
this assumption if our results where different. Second, some entrepreneurs claimed that they had no 
helpers. It is worthwhile investigating if dropping these cases of entrepreneurs without helpers may have 
biased our results. Furthermore, some entrepreneurs may have completed the equity distribution whereas 
others may be in the process of distributing equity. Below, we provide robustness checks for dropping the 
un-embedded entrepreneurs and stage of the new venture. We also examine alternative measures of social 
structure and sample attrition due to lack of control variables. Finally, we focus on the importance of 
spousal helpers and see if classification of family ties as spousal and non-spousal influenced our results. 
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Focal entrepreneur. Out of the 611 cases used in this analysis, the respondent had the highest or 
joint highest equity in 574 cases and in 37 cases the respondent did not have highest equity. In robustness 
analysis, we excluded cases where the respondent is not the focal entrepreneur i.e. highest equity holder. 
We find that our results are robust to including and excluding the cases where respondent does not 
possess highest or joint highest equity in the venture 
Un-embedded entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs without helpers own all the equity in the venture. 
These entrepreneurs are classified as having an equitable distribution of equity and as holding 100% stake 
in the venture. Furthermore, social relationship structure is not defined for these entrepreneurs as they 
have no helpers. The fact that some entrepreneurs have helpers and choose not to give equity whereas 
others have no helpers hence cannot give equity could confound our results. That is, if these entrepreneurs 
had helpers they would distribute equity, lacking helpers they are classified as owing all the equity. There 
were 155 respondents who stated that they do not have anyone helping them with the nascent venture or 
provide information on social relations with the helpers. Shaver (1998) suggests dropping these 
observations but controlling for sample attrition. We estimate a first stage equation where the dependent 
variable takes a value of 1 if an entrepreneur does not have helpers, and use the predicted probabilities as 
a control variable in our estimations. Our results are robust to inclusion of the hazard ratio.  
In process. To control for the temporal aspect of the older nascent ventures distributing equity 
differently, we follow Gartner et al. (2004) in constructing an age cohort variable that places a nascent 
venture in age categories based on the first organizing action undertaken. Furthermore, if the entrepreneur 
tries and fails to get help or is in the process of organizing help, then she will also own all the equity in 
the venture. To distinguish between the causal logic and the qualitative difference in entrepreneurs who 
elect not to get any help and others who try but cannot get help, we use a question that asked the 
respondents whether a start-up team will be organized for this venture as an additional control variable. 
Strong ties. In the PSED respondents were not asked the typically used measure of relationship 
structure i.e. if the individuals shared an affective tie (a strong tie). Lacking such direct measure we check 
if an alternative classification of family; professional and strangers before the start of the new venture 
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yield similar results. Marsden and Campbell (1984) examine the various methods used to measure tie 
strength.  An ideal measure of tie strength would be a 7-point Likert-type scale question on the closeness 
between team members (Marsden and Campbell, 1984; Burt, 1992; Hansen, 1995). Lacking a measure for 
closeness, Marsden and Campbell (p. 499) suggest “… that kinship-based ties are stronger, while ties to 
neighbors or co-workers are weaker, are accurate.”  In the absence of a closeness measure, one option is 
to employ the measure used by Bruderl and Preisendorfer (1998), who classified “spouse/life-partner, 
parents, friends, and relatives” as strong ties,  “business partners, acquaintances, former employers, and 
former co-workers” as professional ties, and “strangers before the new venture” as strangers or no prior 
ties. This classification is within the spirit of a predictor-based measure as a proxy for tie strength as 
suggested by Marsden and Campbell. Similarly, Burt (2000) in a study of women’s career paths through 
entrepreneurship employs such a classification. To check if our results are similar for the alternative 
measure of social relationship structure, we construct a measure for tie strength that weights the ties by 
the relational strength. First, we use a 0 to 2 scale where we code individual helpers, who were strangers 
to the focal entrepreneur before the new venture creation as 0; friends and coworkers as 1; and family as 
2. We then multiplied the number of strong ties helpers with two, weak ties helpers with one, and no ties 
with zero. We then sum the product of ties in a helper network with the weights and divide the sum by the 
maximum possible score. We find that our results are robust to this alternate operationalization.  
 Sample attrition. The starting sample included 830 cases of nascent entrepreneurs. We drop 113 
cases from this set of respondents who said they had no helpers i.e. the un-embedded entrepreneurs as 
social relationship structure is not defined for these cases. Furthermore we drop 42 cases with incomplete 
information on social relationship structure between the respondent and the helpers.  In estimating equity 
distribution and equity retained by the focal entrepreneur (Table 3), we drop 64 cases with missing 
information on dependent or control variables resulting is a sample of 611 cases for the analysis. To 
ensure robustness of the results we estimate sample selection correction recommended by Heckman 
(1979). We find that dropping these cases without information on social structure, dependent or control 
variables, did not bias our results. The results of the correction estimations are available from the authors. 
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Spousal helpers. Some focal entrepreneurs have their spouses helping with the venture. It is 
conceivable that spousal relationship is a special type of family relationship and the distribution of 
ownership to spousal helpers may differ from other family members. In robustness checks, we included 
an additional indicator variable if the respondent had a spouse as a helper. We find that focal 
entrepreneurs with their spouse in the helper group are likely to share the ownership more equally with 
the helpers. However, the influence of professional ties when compared to other family ties than spousal 
is as predicted in hypotheses 1a and 1b. Furthermore, the results for specific human capital variables are 
also no different when the additional control for spousal ties is included. 
In sum, we took several precautions to ensure robust estimates and appropriate interpretation of 
the results. 
7. DISCUSSION  
7.1 Specific Human Capital 
The core findings of this study are that entrepreneurs with specific human capital in the industry 
of the start-up and prior start-up experience are able to retain more equity, and be more selective with the 
equity distribution to their helpers. These entrepreneurs are also able to raise a higher count of 
professional resources from their helpers. However, entrepreneurs with prior start-up experience raise 
more personal resources from their helpers and entrepreneurs with specific industry experience do not 
appear to raise more personal resources. These findings are consistent with the human capital and agency 
view that specific experience enables entrepreneurs to selectively distribute ownership and also raise 
more resources.  
Recent entrepreneurship arguments center on the discovery and exploitation of entrepreneurial 
opportunities.  Within this larger conversation, studies find that prior experience plays a crucial role in 
why individuals are able to identify opportunities based on their industry and market experience (Shane, 
2000; Hellmann, 2002; Gompers et al., 2005). Delmar and Shane (2006) found that industry and start-up 
experience also influence sales and survival of the ventures. We extend these findings by documenting an 
important causal mechanism through which experience (industry and start-up) influences organizational 
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emergence, i.e., the distribution of equity to helpers and concurrent resource mobilization from helpers. 
Individuals with specific experience are able to structure the distribution of equity selectively; 
empowering individuals with higher equity to have a first order interest in contributing resources to form 
a successful venture. In this manner, the entrepreneur retains a significant equity stake as s/he expends the 
most time organizing the new venture.  
Our results reveal that the relationship between industry experience and equity retained by the 
entrepreneur is positive. There is an indication of diminishing marginal returns for experience but the 
inflection point is beyond two standard deviations in experience. When a focal entrepreneur’s experience 
increases by one standard deviation (9.65 years) from no specific industry experience, the entrepreneur’s 
equity retained goes up from 70% to 73% of equity. Further, the specific industry experience increases 
from the mean (8 years) to 17 years; the equity retained shows only a small increase from 73% to 74% 
exhibiting a diminishing marginal returns to experience. Correspondingly, entrepreneurs who possess 
prior start-up experience retain 4.3% more equity than those without such experience.  
We find if the number of family ties in the helper group increases by one standard deviation (.43) 
from the mean (.49), then the entrepreneur’s equity retained decreases by 7.1%. Similarly, when family 
ties increase by one standard deviation, the selective distribution doubles by 8.8%, suggesting that as 
family ties increase in the helper network, the entrepreneur is far less likely to distribute equity 
selectively.  Because these equity structures have persistent effects on future decisions (George et al., 
2005; Zahra et al., 2000), these findings have merit both in theories of organizational emergence and the 
practice of entrepreneurship. Interestingly, the magnitude of difference in equity distribution is 
surprisingly smaller than what is widely assumed; that less experienced entrepreneurs may whittle away 
the equity for non-productive resources. Though this assumption is often discussed in practice, our results 
challenge this belief and calls for further research on why the role of experience is not stronger than what 
is seen. We find that experience does matter, but its relative importance is an empirical issue worth 
discussing and identifying in future research.   
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7.2 Social Relations and Norms of Behavior 
We find that the greater the proportion of family ties in the focal entrepreneur’s helper network 
the less the focal entrepreneur retains of the equity; and the more equal is the distribution of equity among 
the helpers. Furthermore, family ties increase the count of personal resources that the entrepreneur is able 
to garner and not professional resources. The findings on family ties are consistent with work by Ruef and 
colleagues on the importance of family relations in creating and supporting new firms (Ruef, 2004; 2010; 
Ruef, Aldrich & Carter; 2003). In particular these authors have argued for norms that encourage equal 
treatment of different family members which would result is more equal distribution of equity to the 
helpers and less portion retained by the focal entrepreneur. A second line of research suggests that given 
that helpers are not making cost benefit calculus the focal entrepreneur may not need to reward the 
helpers with equity or distribute it equally to all the helpers. This is feasible only when the helpers are 
driven affective norms and the focal entrepreneur is in turn not influenced by the affective norms and 
makes more cost benefit calculus on resulting in unequal distribution of equity to family helpers. The 
results we find clearly support the view that more family members in the helper network leads to more 
equal distribution of equity. Hence we can infer that both the helpers and the focal entrepreneur are bound 
by reciprocal affective norms. 
7.3. Specific Experience and the Composition of the Helper Network 
Our research has some similarities with prior work, but makes distinctive contributions. Our 
model complements a general theory of entrepreneurship as a socially-embedded phenomenon. Our point 
of departure is that specific human capital of entrepreneurs enables them to break the norms of behavior 
among social relations by being more rational and driven by cost-benefit calculus. This finding can be 
observed in the relationship between specific experience and selective distribution of equity and the 
heterogeneity of resources mobilized.  
Could it be that entrepreneurs with specific experience have a different composition of helpers 
and hence they raise different types of resources than entrepreneurs without such experience? Put more 
directly does the composition of helper network mediate the relationship between entrepreneurs 
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experience and resource mobilization. In analysis of the data, we find that there is no difference in the 
composition of helper ties in terms of percentage of familial ties based on the level of specific industry 
experience or start-up experience of the entrepreneur. That is entrepreneurs with specific experience have 
similar proportion of familial ties as entrepreneurs without specific experience. This suggests 
entrepreneurs with specific experience rely of familial ties in a similar manner like entrepreneurs without 
specific experience. However, the entrepreneurs with specific experience are able to generate more 
different professional resources from their helpers.   
Our findings raise important questions pertaining to resource mobilization strategies of 
entrepreneurs with low human capital. Empirical evidence suggests that a third of all new firms may be 
started by individuals due to lack of alternative employment and one in six working adults go through 
spells of unemployment and self-employment (Reynolds et al., 2005). Some entrepreneurs without viable 
alternatives may persist with their sub-optimal ventures (Gimeno et al., 1997).  Social relations may 
provide resources and affective support that enables entrepreneurs without specific skill to persist through 
spells of poor performance. The twin mechanism of lack of alternatives and affective ties that encourage 
the entrepreneur may lead to prolonged persistence of sub-optimal ideas.  This duality of social relations 
as key to mobilizing resources but possibly allowing low potential ideas to persist is an interesting area 
for further study. Do entrepreneurs with family social ties and weak opportunities hold on to their venture 
longer? Conversely, do experienced entrepreneurs with high quality opportunities involve their social 
relations? The intertwined effects of social relationships, experience and the pursuit of opportunities is a 
fruitful area for further research.  
7.4. Entrepreneurs who use Helpers 
Some research in entrepreneurship has focused on the role of teams in the success of a new 
venture. A widely used definition of a team member is an individual who has ownership in the venture 
and is actively involved in the process of founding the venture (Kamm et al., 1990). Research has 
examined the role of teams in survival (Delmar and Shane, 2006), sales or market share growth 
(McDougall et al., 1994), and entry into international markets (Autio et al., 2011).  The common approach 
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is to predict firm survival or growth based on the composition of the start-up teams.  This approach, 
however, ignores a significant portion of entrepreneurs who rely on social relations for the founding of 
their ventures but do not give up equity or do not seek active participation of helpers in the founding 
process.  Hence, by narrowly focusing on teams, prior research doesn’t fully account for helper 
engagement and the dynamics of their influence on survival and performance.   
Entrepreneurs who have helpers and elect not to give ownership are being most selective (Figure 
1) in comparison to entrepreneurs who distribute equity to all their helpers equally, and ignoring these 
ventures will result in a sample selection bias (Berk, 1983). In the PSED sample, we find that 28% of the 
starting sample of nascent entrepreneurs (830) has one or more helpers aiding them with the nascent 
venture. But these entrepreneurs do not give ownership in the new venture to the helpers. This percentage 
is in line with prior studies on entrepreneurship. Ucbasaran et al., (2003) find that nearly 37% of the firms 
in a longitudinal sample in U.K. firms had one individual as the owner after several years post founding 
the venture. Carter at al. (1997) in a study of discontinuance by new retail firms found that nearly 50% of 
firms are started by a single individual (101 out of 203 firms in the sample). In addition, other models of 
entrepreneurship have suggested that entrepreneurship is an iterative, non linear, feedback-driven, 
conceptual and physical process (e.g., Bhave, 1994). Our model suggests that entrepreneurs with specific 
experience have prior knowledge of the setting which enables them to act based on the feedback and 
information they possess as a result of their specific experience.  
In ex post analysis, when we examined the differences between entrepreneurs with helpers, who 
do not distribute and those who do distribute equity we found that entrepreneurs who do not distribute 
equity to their helpers have 9.9 years of specific industry experience whereas entrepreneurs who distribute 
equity had 7.9 years of experience. This difference, which is significant (p<.01), suggests that more 
experienced entrepreneurs hold on to their equity. Furthermore, entrepreneurs who do not distribute 
equity to their helpers are more likely to have prior start-up experience (.52) compared to entrepreneurs 
who distribute equity to their helpers (.4). Dropping these entrepreneurs with high experience who hold 
on to equity in our sample results in lower economic values for the influence of specific experience on 
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equity distribution. Hence, both the theoretical model and the empirical estimation in this study address 
entrepreneurial choices made by a wider range of entrepreneurs than those used by previous research. 
7.5 Overcoming Valuation and Behavioral Uncertainty 
There is a significant literature on principal-agent models that examines aspects of this resource 
mobilization process (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A fundamental assumption is that the individual 
allocating the equity between resource providers can reasonably assess the value of each member’s 
contributions (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Williamson et al., 1975). In the nascent firm formation 
context, there are two issues of theoretical relevance for resource mobilization: valuation uncertainty and 
behavioral uncertainty. Valuation uncertainty, from the resource provider’s perspective, involves the 
valuation of the entrepreneurial opportunity itself. Given the low likelihood of success for new firms, the 
provider needs to ascertain the probability that the venture will not only survive but will also yield 
commensurate rewards for any resources provided to the entrepreneur.  From the entrepreneur’s 
perspective, the valuation of the helper’s resources is problematic.  Resources contributions are difficult 
to value; especially if the entrepreneur does not know what non-cash resources are likely to be important 
in later phases of forming and operating the business (Alvarez and Barney, 2005).  
In addition, the entrepreneur faces behavioral uncertainty on the helper’s willingness to fulfill the 
promise of non-cash resources. The entrepreneur may parse out equity on the belief that the helper will 
provide resources when needed but the helper may fail to deliver and still benefit because of other 
helpers’ contributions; referred to as a free-riding problem (Olson, 1965). Therefore, the entrepreneur 
faces the problem of distributing equity to raise difficult-to-value resources without guarantees that 
helpers who promised resources could be relied upon to deliver.  Whereas relying on close social relations 
provides a solution to the behavioral uncertainty, our study suggests that it introduces pathologies of its 
own, i.e. equal distribution of ownership to helpers regardless of their ability and a greater depletion of 
the equity held by the focal entrepreneur. Some entrepreneurs with specific human capital are able to 
overcome the valuation uncertainty. We suggest that the prior specific industry experience and prior start-
up experience enables some entrepreneurs to understand which resources are needed, who possesses these 
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resources and how to value these heterogeneous resources such that all individuals who receive a share in 
the equity of the new venture contribute optimal effort. 
7.6 Limitations and Further Research 
 This study is not without its limitations. First we start with a focal entrepreneur as our unit of 
analysis.  Whereas in theory, the focal entrepreneur is clearly identifiable, we face an empirical issue in 
making such a distinction. In the PSED dataset, there is information only for the respondent for a number 
of variables. We found that dropping 37 cases of which the respondent is not the focal entrepreneur does 
not unduly bias our results. There is usually a trade-off between precision of the measures used in a study 
and the impact that results in a study have for wider audience. The PSED is broad based data collection 
exercise involving researchers from several domains. Whereas the results are generalizable to several 
literatures, there is always room for more precise measures from the perspective of any one literature.  
  Second, we used an observed pattern of ownership distribution and resource mobilization to trace 
the decision making logic of the focal entrepreneurs. Whereas empirical anomaly-based analysis may be 
appropriate, it could be complemented by a process study that includes the intentions and perceptions of 
the entrepreneurs when they organize the venture. Third, we have examined the main effects of network 
composition and the human capital of the focal entrepreneur on resource assembly and ownership 
distribution. Future studies should look at the joint effect of these factors and compensating strategies by 
entrepreneurs. Finally, past research has examined the influence of role-assignment in coordinating effort 
in new ventures (Burton at al., 2002). Ownership distribution may lead to informal hierarchies in new 
ventures with flat structures; this informal hierarchy may influence coordination of activities in the new 
venture. Future studies could examine the influence of ownership distribution in enabling and hindering 
coordination of activities in a new venture. 
8. CONCLUSION 
Apart from highlighting the practical import of experience in the distribution of equity and the 
resource mobilization, this study makes key theoretical contributions. First, we offer a contingent model 
of organizing a new venture that enables an entrepreneur to overcome behavioral and valuation 
 35 
uncertainty. In particular, sharing interest evenly across helpers offers a partial explanation of the equity-
for-resource exchange. We suggest that the human capital of the entrepreneur helps the entrepreneur 
overcome problems surrounding the valuation of resources and behavioral uncertainty in the group 
respectively. Consequently some entrepreneurs with specific human capital relevant to the nascent 
venture are able to overcome valuation and behavioral uncertainties to distribute ownership selectively 
and raise more resources. Second, a substantive literature focuses on technology firms with professional 
investors, which account for a fraction of new venture formation, whereas the findings of this study are 
generalizable to the dominant populace of privately held firms. There are over 25 million private firms in 
the US alone (SBA, 2003). Many of these private firms are resource-constrained and leverage limited 
resources to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities. In this study, we explain how equity distribution 
enables entrepreneurs to secure critical resources for the nascent venture. By addressing an issue of 
theoretical relevance on the effects of social relationships on resource mobilization, this study sheds light 
on a complex and pervasive problem of resource assembly faced by entrepreneurs.   
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Figure 1 
Focal Entrepreneur Distribution of Equity to Helpers 
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TABLE 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean STD. Minimum Maximum 
Dependent Variables 
    Respondent is Focal Entrepreneur .94 .24 0 1 
Selective Distribution of Equity (GINI) .47 .28 0 0.83 
Equity Retained by Entrepreneur (%) .70 .28 0.01 1 
Professional Resources 8.69 5.98 0 43 
Personal Resources 1.31 1.90 0 13 
Focal Entrepreneur Variables 
    Age 39.36 10.67 18 73 
Gender: Male .51 .50 0 1 
Education: High School .27 .45 0 1 
Education: College .59 .49 0 1 
Education: Post College .14 .34 0 1 
Work Experience 17.36 10.39 1 60 
Managerial Experience 8.20 7.82 0 40 
Income (000$) 61.94 84.78 2.5 1800 
Specific Industry Experience 8.60 9.74 0 60 
Start-up Experience (indicator) .46 .50 0 1 
Nascent Venture Variables 
    Industry: Retail .24 .43 0 1 
Industry: Restaurant .04 .20 0 1 
Industry: Customer Services .27 .45 0 1 
Industry: Health education .12 .32 0 1 
Industry: Other .33 .47 0 1 
Helper Network Size 2.56 1.51 1 9 
Proportion of Institutional Members .004 .03 0 0.5 
Legal Form .96 .19 0 1 
Gender Diversity .25 .44 0 1 
Ethnicity Diversity .66 .48 0 1 
Age Diversity 7.88 5.37 0 28.99 
Side Payments .39 .33 0 1 
Proportion of Family Ties .49 .43 0 1 
Proportion of Professional Ties .44 .42 0 1 
Proportion of Strangers before Start-up .06 .19 0 1 
Proportion equity holders .36 .41 0 1 
Average money received (000'$)* 13.70 38.21 0 776.25 
Average time received (hours)* 823.81 950.37 0 9000 
Environment Variables 
    Leverage 1.14 .45 0.25 4.33 
Dynamism .61 .67 0 2 
Number of observations is 611; * missing values are mean imputed. 
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 TABLE 2: Correlations  
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Respondent is Focal Entrepreneur 1 
              2 Selective Distribution of Equity (GINI) -.02 1 
             3 Equity Retained by Entrepreneur (%) .33 .63 1 
            4 Professional Resources -.13 .11 -.41 1 
           5 Personal Resources .01 .04 -.16 .64 1 
          6 Age .03 .00 .02 -.05 -.15 1 
         7 Gender: Male -.03 -.10 -.10 .08 .02 -.07 1 
        8 Education: High School .06 .00 .05 -.05 .07 -.11 .06 1 
       9 Education: College .03 -.04 -.04 .00 -.05 -.03 -.04 -.74 1 
      10 Education: Post College -.11 .06 -.01 .06 -.02 .19 -.02 -.24 -.48 1 
     11 Work Experience .01 -.01 .01 -.06 -.15 .77 .09 -.08 .00 .11 1 
    12 Managerial Experience -.04 -.05 -.07 .01 -.11 .51 .08 -.15 .02 .16 .63 1 
   13 Income (000$) -.04 -.06 -.11 .05 -.03 .09 -.03 -.04 -.02 .08 .07 .07 1 
  14 Specific Industry Experience .04 .04 .09 -.03 -.05 .35 .10 -.06 -.07 .19 .38 .28 .05 1 
 15 Start-up Experience (indicator) .01 .14 .10 .04 .04 .20 .00 -.10 .01 .12 .19 .27 .04 .11 1 
16 Network Size (Roster)
  -.12 .63 .00 .57 .20 .03 -.04 -.06 -.02 .11 .01 .05 .03 -.04 .07 
17 Proportion of institutional Members -.24 .00 -.14 .01 -.06 -.01 .11 -.07 .01 .08 .02 .07 .04 .08 .03 
18 Legal Form .06 .02 .04 .04 .07 .00 .01 .00 -.04 .05 .02 .07 .01 .05 .05 
19 Gender Diversity .06 .01 .15 -.10 -.07 -.04 .17 .00 .03 -.03 .02 -.01 -.03 .04 .08 
20 Ethnicity Diversity -.01 -.08 -.23 .05 -.07 .04 -.05 -.03 -.01 .06 .00 .04 .06 -.08 -.07 
21 Age Diversity -.08 .29 .03 .13 .07 .03 -.09 .01 -.03 .03 .00 .02 -.04 -.05 .02 
22 Side Payments -.02 .16 .28 -.21 -.17 .04 .08 -.06 .01 .07 .08 .04 .01 .14 .05 
23 Proportion of Family Ties .07 -.43 -.23 -.09 .11 -.01 -.15 .09 -.02 -.09 -.05 .00 -.04 -.07 -.10 
24 Proportion of Professional Ties -.01 .41 .24 .07 -.12 .04 .13 -.10 .05 .06 .08 .02 .02 .08 .09 
25 Proportion of Strangers before Start-up -.14 .08 .00 .05 .01 -.06 .05 .01 -.06 .07 -.06 -.04 .05 -.02 .02 
26 Proportion equity holders -.13 -.88 -.68 .00 -.03 .02 .08 -.01 .02 -.01 .04 .09 .06 -.06 -.11 
27 Average money received (000'$) -.21 .10 -.10 .25 .16 .05 .05 -.06 -.02 .10 .03 .08 .03 .06 .07 
28 Average time received (hours) -.08 .01 -.09 .13 .12 .00 -.03 .05 -.04 -.01 -.05 .02 .00 .02 -.02 
29 Leverage -.06 .06 .00 .04 -.02 .06 .04 -.02 -.02 .05 .07 .07 -.01 .08 -.01 
30 Dynamism -.07 .03 -.04 .18 .16 -.02 .09 -.04 -.04 .10 .04 .03 .01 .04 .07 
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TABLE 2: Cont. 
  
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
1 Respondent is Focal Entrepreneur 
               2 Selective Distribution of Equity (GINI) 
               3 Equity Retained by Entrepreneur (%) 
               4 Professional Resources 
               5 Personal Resources 
               6 Age 
               7 Gender: Male 
               8 Education: High School 
               9 Education: College 
               10 Education: Post College 
               11 Work Experience 
               12 Managerial Experience 
               13 Income (000$) 
               14 Specific Industry Experience 
               15 Start-up Experience (indicator) 
               16 Helper Network Size
  1 
              17 Proportion of institutional Members .02 1 
             18 Legal Form .03 .02 1 
            19 Gender Diversity -.15 -.07 .01 1 
           20 Ethnicity Diversity .12 -.01 .06 -.14 1 
          21 Age Diversity .33 -.01 .00 -.07 .05 1 
         22 Side Payments -.07 .11 .00 .13 -.13 .04 1 
        23 Proportion of Family Ties -.29 -.04 -.01 -.34 .17 .04 -.13 1 
       24 Proportion of Professional Ties .25 .03 .01 .31 -.13 -.06 .08 -.90 1 
      25 Proportion of Strangers before Start-up .11 .03 -.01 .07 -.10 .04 .12 -.29 -.15 1 
     26 Proportion helpers with equity -.37 .07 -.03 -.14 .20 -.21 -.19 .46 -.45 -.07 1 
    27 Average money received (000'$) .18 .13 .03 -.03 .05 .05 .02 -.05 .02 .06 -.05 1 
   28 Average time received (hours) .05 -.04 .03 .02 .01 .02 -.05 -.05 .02 .07 -.02 .28 1 
  29 Leverage .08 .07 .05 .07 -.03 .04 .03 -.11 .11 .01 -.03 .06 .02 1 
 30 Dynamism .07 .00 -.02 .02 -.04 .02 .04 -.07 .06 .03 -.02 .08 .06 .05 1 
Number of observations is 611. All correlations greater than .07 are significant at p<.05 level. 
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TABLE 3: Fractional Logit Estimation of Proportion of Equity Retained and Selective Distribution 
 Equity Retained  Selective Distribution (GINI)  
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
Entrepreneur Controls         
Age 0.0049 (0.01) 0.0013 (0.01) -0.0038 (0.01) -0.0054 (0.01) 
Gender: Male -0.31*** (0.11) -0.40*** (0.12) -0.22*** (0.08) -0.29*** (0.08) 
Work experience 0.0043 (0.01) -0.0012 (0.01) 0.0092 (0.01) -0.0012 (0.01) 
Managerial experience -0.012 (0.01) -0.017* (0.01) -0.018*** (0.01) -0.017** (0.01) 
Income (000’s) -0.0014** (0.00) -0.0016*** (0.00) -0.00085 (0.00) -0.0011* (0.00) 
Group Structure Controls         
Helper Network Size 0.10** (0.05) -0.025 (0.05) 0.57*** (0.04) 0.46*** (0.04) 
Proportion of institutional Members -3.32** (1.39) -5.11 (3.18) -0.61 (1.61) -2.56 (2.92) 
Legal Form (determined =1) 0.49** (0.23) 0.32 (0.21) 0.14 (0.20) 0.051 (0.17) 
Gender Diversity (same gender=1) 0.18 (0.13) 0.10 (0.15) 0.17* (0.09) -0.028 (0.09) 
Ethnicity Diversity (same =1) -0.50*** (0.12) -0.44*** (0.13) -0.34*** (0.09) -0.23*** (0.09) 
Age Diversity (Std. Dev.) 0.0025 (0.01) 0.012 (0.01) 0.021*** (0.01) 0.029*** (0.01) 
Side Payments 1.31*** (0.18) 1.23*** (0.19) 0.75*** (0.13) 0.74*** (0.13) 
Leverage 0.092 (0.11) 0.038 (0.12) -0.013 (0.08) -0.020 (0.08) 
Dynamism -0.13 (0.08) -0.15* (0.08) -0.021 (0.06) -0.062 (0.06) 
Correction for self-selection 0.52* (0.28) -0.23 (0.41) 0.48*** (0.18) -0.37 (0.25) 
Proportion of helper network with no 
professional or family ties (strangers) before the 
Nascent Venture  (comparison group is family 
ties)‡ 
  0.17 (0.37)   0.36 (0.23) 
 
Theory Variables         
Proportion of Professional Ties in helper 
network (comparison group is family ties) ‡ 
  0.83*** (0.20)   0.97*** (0.13) 
Specific Industry Experience   0.017* (0.01)   0.013* (0.01) 
Specific Experience Squared   -0.00027 (0.00)   -0.00013 (0.00) 
Start-up Experience (indicator)   0.24** (0.11)   0.22*** (0.08) 
Log Likelihood -287.0  -264.0  -278.2  -262.7  
Number of observations is 611. Standard errors in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01; ‡ The comparison group is the proportion of helper network that is composed of family ties to the 
entrepreneur. Standard errors in parenthesis; Controls for industry of venture, age of venture, entrepreneurs’ ethnicity, education, and new venture without any helpers are included but not reported. 
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 TABLE 4: Negative Binominal Estimates of Resources Mobilized by Entrepreneur 
 Professional Resources  Personal Resources  
 Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  
Entrepreneur Controls         
Age -0.0041 (0.00) -0.0044 (0.00) -0.012 (0.01) -0.017** (0.01) 
Gender: Male 0.085** (0.04) 0.076* (0.04) 0.033 (0.11) 0.12 (0.11) 
Work experience -0.0022 (0.00) -0.0026 (0.00) -0.0078 (0.01) -0.0049 (0.01) 
Managerial experience 0.0001 (0.00) -0.0015 (0.00) -0.010 (0.01) -0.018* (0.01) 
Income (000’s) 0.0003 (0.00) 0.0002 (0.00) -0.00002 (0.00) 0.0006 (0.00) 
Nascent Venture Controls         
Helper Network Size 0.31*** (0.02) 0.32*** (0.02) 0.24*** (0.05) 0.30*** (0.05) 
Proportion of Institutional Members 0.95 (0.74) 1.00 (0.73) -2.08 (2.89) -1.97 (2.77) 
Legal Form (determined =1) 0.18 (0.11) 0.14 (0.11) 0.68** (0.34) 0.57* (0.33) 
Gender Diversity (same gender=1) 0.0044 (0.05) -0.016 (0.05) -0.14 (0.13) 0.031 (0.13) 
Ethnicity Diversity (same =1) 0.00063 (0.04) 0.0012 (0.04) -0.24** (0.11) -0.30*** (0.11) 
Age Diversity (Std. Dev.) -0.00098 (0.00) 0.00019 (0.00) 0.012 (0.01) -0.0018 (0.01) 
Side Payments -0.32*** (0.06) -0.31*** (0.06) -0.62*** (0.18) -0.65*** (0.18) 
Distribution of ownership (Gini) -0.92*** (0.19) -1.01*** (0.19) -0.92* (0.51) -1.17** (0.50) 
Proportion of helpers with equity -0.13 (0.12) -0.14 (0.12) -0.30 (0.30) -0.73** (0.30) 
Average money received (000’s) 0.0008* (0.00) 0.0007* (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 
Average hours of help received 0.00003 (0.00) 0.00003 (0.00) 0.0001 (0.00) 0.0001** (0.00) 
Theory Variables         
Proportion of Professional Ties in helper network 
(comparison group is helpers who are strangers 
before the start of new venture) ‡ 
  0.23** (0.11)   0.12 (0.32) 
Proportion of helper network with family ties  
(comparison group is helpers who are strangers 
before the start of new venture)‡ 
  0.19 (0.12)   0.99*** (0.32) 
Specific Industry Experience   0.015*** (0.01)   0.025 (0.02) 
Specific Experience Squared   -0.00044** (0.00)   -0.00063 (0.00) 
Start-up Experience (indicator)   0.074* (0.04)   0.33*** (0.11) 
Log Likelihood -1650.5  -1642.5  -904.3  -882.7  
Number of observations is equal to 611 entrepreneurs with one or more helpers; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001;   ‡ The comparison group is helpers who are strangers before the start of the new 
venture to the focal entrepreneur. Standard errors in parenthesis; Controls for industry of venture, age of venture, entrepreneurs’ ethnicity, education, and new venture without any helpers are 
included but not reported. 
